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Abstract
Surveys of businessmen and anecdotal evidence blame intermediary agents–middlemen
hired by corporations and individuals–for increasing corruption in the developing world. Al-
though this problem has gained the attention of policy makers, there has been little formal
analysis of it in the economics literature. In a game theoretic model analyzing the interac-
tion between clients, public oﬃcial and intermediary agents, we ﬁnd that intermediary agents
do worsen the impact of corruption and that traditional methods of ﬁghting corruption can
actually increase corruption in the presence of intermediary agents.
JEL classiﬁcation: D73, K42, L14, O17
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Despite the widespread introduction of laws against bribery for international businesses, ﬁnancial
corruption remains a serious problem. In a survey of business development directors of 50 US and 50
European companies, an overwhelming majority of those surveyed stated that US companies used
middlemen such as agents, joint venture partners or foreign subsidiaries to avoid direct involvement
with corruption either ‘regularly’ or ‘occasionally’ (Control Risks Group, Information Services Team
[6]). There is also plenty of anecdotal evidence which blames intermediary agents–middlemen hired
by corporations and individuals–for increasing corruption in the developing world (Wiehen [18]).
Although this problem has gained the attention of policy makers and non-governmental organizations
there has been little formal analysis of it in the economics literature.
What are the eﬀects of intermediary agents on corruption? Do the solutions to the corruption
problem change in the presence of intermediaries? In this paper, we develop a simple model that
captures the eﬀect of key policy variables that are used to ﬁght corruption. We then examine how
the presence of intermediary agents change the amount of corruption and the eﬀectiveness of policy
variables in ﬁghting corruption. We show that intermediaries worsen the impact of corruption and
make it impossible to eradicate corruption using traditional techniques. In fact standard techniques
like increasing monitoring or penalties can worsen the impact of corruption. Methods that do not
consider the impact of intermediaries are unlikely to succeed.
1Several authors have pointed out that intermediary agents may enable corruption by acting as
guarantors in the dealing between client and bureaucrat (Bayar [3], Lambsdorﬀ [10], Oldenburg [15],
della Porta and Vanucci [16]). There are important transaction costs, including the costs of searching
for partners, determining contract conditions and enforcing contract terms, in any corrupt business
deal. Intermediary agents can lower transaction costs of a corrupt deal by providing information to
potential clients with respect to the capability of the bureaucrat to actually provide the required
service (Lambsdorﬀ [10]). When there is the possibility that the bribed oﬃcials may not deliver the
promised services due to either inability or unwillingness, an established intermediary agent with
superior knowledge about the trustworthiness and ability of the bureaucrat to complete the corrupt
transaction can be essential. Unlike the actual supplier of a corrupt service, an intermediary may
be in a position to publicly disclose her past record and establish a reputation for getting deals
done. Her repeated relationship with the bureaucrat can induce cooperation from the bureaucrat
to complete the corrupt transaction. We incorporate these ideas to our model by allowing that a
bribed oﬃcial may not always deliver the “goods” when interacting with a client directly but always
keeps his promise if an intermediary is involved.
To our knowledge ours is one of the ﬁrst papers that analyze the eﬀects of intermediary agents
on corruption by developing a formal theoretical model. Bayar presents a preliminary model which
makes some strong simplifying assumptions. For example she assumes that if there are intermediaries
then bureaucrats will only ask for bribes from intermediary agents. This is contradicted by casual
empiricism. We often observe that some clients pay bribes directly while others use intermediaries.
We believe that such an outcome should be an implication of equilibrium and not a modelling
assumption. In the equilibrium of our model it is very common for some clients to oﬀer bribes directly
to the bureaucrat while others choose to hire intermediary agents. In fact optimal government policy
will make this even more common.
In this paper we are purely focusing on reducing corruption. We assume that there is some
optimal level of regulation set by the government and clients (individuals or ﬁrms) may be willing
to pay bribes to circumvent this regulation. We show that intermediaries do decrease the quantity
of regulation, as expected, but do not actually change the number of bribes paid to bureaucrats.
Interestingly a wide variety of techniques used by governments might worsen corruption in the pres-
ence of intermediaries. Not only increasing penalties and monitoring, but also steps such as rotating
bureaucrats in order to prevent entrenchment or requiring signatures from multiple bureaucrats in
order to limit their discretionary power may result in reduced regulation.
There is a strand in the corruption literature suggesting that in the context of pervasive and
cumbersome regulations in developing countries, corruption may actually improve eﬃciency and
help growth (Leﬀ, [12]). For example, if corruption is considered as speed money which reduces
delay in moving ﬁles in administrative oﬃces and in getting ahead in slow-moving queues, one
2can argue that corruption may improve eﬃciency. Critiques of this literature point out that quite
often distortions are not exogenous to the system and are instead often part of the built-in corrupt
practices of a patron-client political system (Bardhan [2]). As for speed money, Myrdal [13] points
out that corrupt oﬃcials may instead of speeding up, actually cause administrative delays in order
to attract more bribes. Banerjee [1] examines situations where bureaucrats create red tape and
use it to screen clients of diﬀerent types. Recent empirical studies have shown that the extent of
corruption is signiﬁcantly linked to paucity of GDP growth [14].
In this paper we are going to sidestep the argument that corruption may increase eﬃciency if there
is excessive regulation. We will assume that regulation is justiﬁed and corruption is undesirable.
The optimal level of regulation is not zero. We need regulations to enforce legal rights, administer
quality standards, solve problems arising from negative externalities of production and exchange
and prevent tax evasion. Is increasing ﬁnes and penalties for corrupt behavior the solution to
the corruption problem? Will moving bureaucrats around the country help reduce entrenchment
of corrupt actors? Of course the interested reader could easily take the opposite position that
corruption improves eﬃciency and still beneﬁt from our analysis.
There is some empirical evidence that investors’ conﬁdence is not only adversely aﬀected by
corruption but also by the lack of predictability and conﬁdence that accompanies corrupt deals
(Campos, Lien and Pradhan [4], Kaufmann and Wei [9]). Based on this evidence one could argue
that intermediary agents might increase investors’ conﬁdence by increasing the predictability and
reliability of corrupt deals. Lambsdorﬀ [11] provides evidence to the contrary and in a cross-country
study shows that conﬁdence in corrupt deals enhances the further spread of corruption.
In the next section, we present our formal model. Section 3 presents the equilibrium without
intermediaries. Section 4 presents the equilibrium in the presence of intermediary agents. In section
5, we discuss whether solutions to the corruption problem change when intermediaries are present. In
section 6 we discuss several extensions and modiﬁcations of our basic model, and section 7 concludes.
2M o d e l
In this paper, the term corruption refers to the use of public oﬃce for private gains, where a
bureaucrat entrusted with carrying out a task by the public engages in some sort of malfeasance for
private enrichment which is diﬃcult to monitor by the public. Speciﬁcally a corrupt bureaucrat can
reduce the eﬃcient level of regulation in exchange for a bribe.
In any model of this sort one will have three primary types of players. First is the client–
the individual or the corporation that is subject to a bureaucratic regulation, second must be the
bureaucrat who is responsible of administering the regulation and making sure that each client
complies with it. Third is the intermediary–an entity that the client can hire to deal with the
3bureaucrat on her behalf. The bureaucrat will have monopoly power since clients must satisfy the
regulations. There will be a large number of clients–technically a continuum. Since the market for
intermediaries is informal–generally without government license or even recognition–and without
high ﬁxed costs we assume that this market is competitive. In Section 4.1 we discuss the impact of
altering this assumption.
Before the interaction the bureaucrat sets two bribe levels–the amount they demand from a
client who comes directly and the amount they demand from intermediaries. One can think of this
as clients and intermediaries knowing these amounts based on past interactions, but formally this
is the ﬁrst stage in our extensive form game. Then the intermediary determines his fees, and the
client’s type is determined. Next, the client decides whether or not to use the intermediary and
ﬁnally either the intermediary (if used) or the client (if intermediary is not used) decides whether
or not to bribe the bureaucrat.




where 0 ≤ θ < θ with
a cumulative distribution function G(·) (which is diﬀerentiable and has an increasing hazard rate1).
We can interpret this diﬀerence in opportunity costs of regulations as if regulations are more diﬃcult
to meet for less worthy clients. For simplicity we normalize the mass of clients to one. A client who
has to go through a level of regulation r and pay fees of t then has a utility:
U (θ,r,t)=v − θr − t (1)
where v is value of service, r ∈ {rl,r∗}.T h el e v e lr∗ is the optimal regulation the government wants
the client to face, and rl is the level the bureaucrat can decrease it to if he wishes; let ∆ = r∗ −rl
> 0. W ea s s u m et h a tv>θr∗ or that it is always worthwhile getting the service. In the case of
indiﬀerence clients will oﬀer bribes and use intermediaries.
The intermediary’s payoﬀ then is:
uI =
½
t − c if services are used.
t else
Where t is the amount of transfers paid and received, and c is the opportunity cost of using the
intermediary. Notice that c<0 is allowed, what this means is that while the intermediary does have
direct costs–her time and expenses–through her knowledge of the regulations she saves clients
so much that it is cost eﬀective to use the intermediary. Remember that a common justiﬁcation
for using intermediaries is that they know the bureaucracy better, thus it is quite possible that
the opportunity cost of using them is negative. Formally one should recognize that the price an
intermediary charges for her services in our model is the opportunity cost price for the client.
1It is standard to assume that hazard rate (deﬁned as
g(θ)
1−G(θ)) is increasing. This property is satisﬁed by normal,
uniform and most other common distributions.
4Since in this paper we are discussing the impact of intermediaries it does not make sense to
consider the situation where intermediaries are not viable. To avoid this situation we assume that
c<¯ θ∆. What this assumption means is that it is not cost prohibitive for the highest type to use the
intermediary in return for a lower level of regulation. Also notice how weak of an assumption this
is, if we think of ∆ as a period of time it will take to satisfy the regulations then this is equivalent
to assuming that the highest wage individual can always ﬁnd someone who will work for less. One
might want to consider c as a function of ∆, we will consider this extension in Section 6.1.
The bureaucrat has a simple proﬁt function, just Π = t,w h e r et is the amount the bureaucrat
is paid for being bribed. We should note that some bureaucrats might be honest and never oﬀer
bribes, and also that this bureaucrat is paid a salary which we normalize to zero.
Both bureaucrats and clients have reasons to prefer intermediaries as stated in the following two
assumptions:
Assumptions Bureaucrats bribed by:
1. Clients do not always “stay bribed,” i.e., sometimes they do not reduce the level of
regulations.
2. Intermediaries always “stay bribed” and are never caught.
The reason for these assumptions is based on the repeated nature of the interaction between
an intermediary and a bureaucrat. A client generally only wants a service once, thus after being
bribed it might be easier for the bureaucrat to just take the money without reducing the amount of
regulation. In other words, a bureaucrat faces a moral hazard problem since his relationship with the
client is a one shot interaction. On the other hand an intermediary will have a repeated relationship
with the bureaucrat, requiring the service multiple times on behalf of diﬀerent clients, thus it would
not be sensible for the bureaucrat to renege on the deal. As Lambsdorﬀ [10] argues the intermediary
may act as the guarantor of the deal. Technically the ﬁrst assumption means that clients who bribe
bureaucrats directly face regulation level rl with probability η ∈ (0,1), with probability 1 − η they
face regulation level r∗. If a client uses an intermediary to pay a bribe then the regulation level is
rl.
The assumption that bureaucrats bribed by an intermediary can not be caught is based on the
government needing the briber’s testimony to convict a bureaucrat. As Lambsdorﬀ [10] argues
bureaucrats prefer dealing with intermediaries to avoid the risk of exposure from corrupt deals.
Formally we assume that the government investigates each bureaucrat-client interaction with prob-
ability ρ,a n di fi tﬁnds that regulation level is reduced to rl and that a bribe has been paid it ﬁnes
the bureaucrat by the amount F.2 If the government only discovers that regulation level is reduced
without ﬁnding evidence that a bribe has been paid, this is not suﬃcient to ﬁnd a bureaucrat guilty
2F can also be considered as jail time or lost wages.
5of corruption–such an outcome might be the result of an honest mistake. Hence the government
requires evidence on bribery and corruption which only the client or intermediary can provide. It is
fairly simple to design an incentive scheme for truthful testimony from the client. We will assume
that according to this incentive scheme, the cost of her regulation will not change as a reward for
truthful testimony. On the other hand it is unlikely that the intermediary will testify against her
partner in crime. Due to the repeated nature of her business with the bureaucrat an intermediary
agent is a lot more vested in the continuance of this relationship than the client. An intermediary
agent which blows the whistle on the bureaucrat essentially looses his job. Thus intermediaries never
testify, and bureaucrats who are bribed by intermediaries have nothing to fear from the government.
Also clients who use intermediaries will never testify since as far as they are concerned they pay a fee
to the intermediary and not a bribe to the bureaucrat. Hence our second assumption indicates that
for a bureaucrat to be caught he must have reduced the level of regulations and have been bribed
directly by a client.
Notice that this model could easily be modiﬁed so that the client only sometimes confesses when
she bribes the bureaucrat directly. We could also allow for the possibility that intermediaries
sometimes confess, however since they generally exist in an informal sector they have little incentive
for this. We think that confession is possible only if government regulates this industry and discuss
this possibility in Section 6.2.
The bureaucrat will choose two bribe levels, one for clients who use the intermediary (bi)a n d






.I fab r i b ei s∅ then no bribe is asked.
If the client pays no bribe the regulation level is r∗.
Monitoring bureaucracy ρ, ﬁnes on corrupt oﬃcials F, bureaucrat’s trustworthiness η, and his
discretionary power ∆ are the policy variables that we will focus on in our analysis. To ﬁght cor-
ruption, governments may investigate more cases (increase ρ), increase the penalties for bureaucrats
who are caught (raise F), limit bureaucrats’ discretionary power (decrease ∆) by for example re-
quiring signatures from multiple oﬃcials and reduce bureaucrats’ trustworthiness (decrease η)b y
preventing entrenchment through periodic job rotation. We are interested in analyzing the eﬀects
of these policy variables on the quantity of regulation and corruption with or without the presence
of intermediary agents.
3 The Equilibrium without Intermediaries
We now present our base case which is the equilibrium without any intermediaries. The proﬁt
function of the bureaucrat in this case is:
6Π(bd,θd)=
½
(bd − ηρF)(1− G(θd)) bd 6= ∅
0 bd = ∅ (2)
Where θd is the marginal type who is indiﬀerent between paying and not paying the bribe. To
explain this proﬁt function if θ ≥ θd then the bureaucrat’s revenue is bd.I f h e d o e s n o t r e d u c e t h e
red tape he has no expected cost, and he only reduce the red tape with probability η.I f h e d o e s ,
then with probability ρ they have to pay the ﬁne of F, so their expected cost per bribe accepted is
ηρF.T o ﬁnd the marginal type who will pay the bribe we look at the equation:
Er [U (θd,r,b d)] = U (θd,r ∗,0) (3)
















∆ then we can set θd = ¯ θ,i fH (θ) >
ρF
∆ then we can set θd = θ.






Notice we use a d superscript on this case to facilitate comparison with the cases when the bureaucrat
can accept bribes from intermediaries.
Lemma 1 (Existence) When bd 6= ∅ it must be that the expected beneﬁtt ot h eh i g h e s tt y p ei s
higher than the expected cost to the bureaucrat.
Proof. Notice that H (θ) is strictly increasing and that H
¡¯ θ
¢
= ¯ θ.F u r t h e r m o r et h eﬁrst order
condition of the bureaucrat’s objective function can be written as
ρF
∆ − H (θ)=0 .T h u sbd 6= ∅ if
and only if
ρF
∆ − ¯ θ ≤ 0. If the latter statement is true then this means η¯ θ∆ ≥ ηρF which is the
mathematical expression of the statement above.
Notice how this model captures standard government strategies to ﬁght corruption (Bardhan
[2], Rose-Ackerman [17]). To ﬁght corruption, governments will investigate more cases (increase ρ),
increase the penalties for bureaucrats who are caught (raise F), and limit bureaucrats’ discretionary
power by decreasing the amount they can reduce the level of regulation (∆). In our model, these
7all directly decrease the amount of bribery by increasing θd.R e d u c i n gη on the other hand, directly
increases the quantity of regulation even though it does not directly eﬀect θd. While initially it might
seem surprising that it does not change θd the intuition for this is straightforward. While reducing
η will reduce expected beneﬁts to the client from a possible regulation reduction it also decreases
her costs proportionally since bureaucrats must lower their bribe levels for a less certain favor.
4 The Equilibrium with Intermediaries
To ﬁnd the equilibria we just need to look for the proﬁt maximizing alternative among the four
options available to the bureaucrat: 1) He never accept bribes, 2) He only accepts bribes directly
from clients, 3) He only accepts bribes from intermediaries; 4) He always accepts bribes (both directly
and from intermediaries). We will ﬁnd the equilibrium by ﬁrst ﬁnding the bureaucrat’s proﬁts under
each option and then maximizing his proﬁts over his various options.
4.1 Bureaucrat’s Proﬁt under his Four Options
The ﬁrst option, never accepting bribes, will occur only when all other alternatives give negative
payoﬀs, we denote this as bi = ∅ and bd = ∅. The second option, only accepting bribes directly from
clients, is essentially the same as the case without intermediaries, discussed in Section 3; now we
can denote this as bi = ∅ and bd 6= ∅. This leaves the last two options to be analyzed. The third
option can be characterized as bi 6= ∅ and bd = ∅ and the fourth as bd 6= ∅ and bi 6= θ.N o t i c e
that throughout this analysis we only allow for intermediaries, whether or not they are used will be
endogenous to the model. One general result is that:
Lemma 2 If intermediaries are used and pi is the intermediary’s fee to reduce regulation then
pi = bi + c.
This is a simple implication of the competitive nature of the intermediaries market. If the market
is not competitive then it would make clients less likely to use intermediaries but would not change
the existence conditions. To understand this consider the extreme case when the intermediary is a
monopolist. In this case she and the bureaucrat would charge the client a double markup, decreasing
the incentive to use an intermediary. But the existence conditions would remain the same because
essentially the bureaucrat and intermediary would be splitting the proﬁts. Though the proﬁts of the
bureaucrat will be reduced he will prefer positive proﬁts to no proﬁts, thus any time intermediaries
are used in the following analysis they would be also be used under this alternative model.
84.1.1 The Third Option: All Bribers choose to use Intermediaries (bd = ∅)
This case is very similar to the case without intermediaries. The bureaucrat’s proﬁt function is:
Π(bi,θi)=
½
bi (1 − G(θi)) bi 6= ∅
0 bi = ∅ (7)
Where θi is the marginal type who is indiﬀerent between using the intermediary and not paying
a bribe. Notice that here there is no expected cost since the bureaucrat will never be caught. How
we determine θi depends on whether c is positive or negative. If c is positive clients have essentially
the same choice as in the direct case, only this time they will just hire the intermediary instead of
paying a bribe and their expected level of regulation will be lower, or U (θi,r l,p i)=U (θi,r ∗,0),a n d
then bi = θi∆−c.I fc is negative it is cost saving for everyone to use the intermediary, thus we will
assume that everyone uses intermediaries but only some of them might be paying bribes. In this case
θi is determined by U (θi,r l,p i)=U (θi,r∗,c),o rbi = θi∆. We can summarize both cases by saying








then we set θi = θ.W eu s ea ni
superscript on the proﬁt function to denote the case where all bribers choose to use intermediaries
and throughout this analysis θi denotes a person who has a choice between not bribing and using
an intermediary to bribe.






Lemma 3 (Existence) If all bribers choose to use intermediaries then the expected beneﬁtt ot h e
highest type must be greater than the cost of using the intermediary.
Proof. See the proof of Lemma 1.
Note that we always assume the condition in this lemma which is ¯ θ∆ >c .This assumption
is equivalent to intermediaries being economically viable. Essentially this shows that if someone
will use the intermediary then this market will exist. One interpretation of θ is the opportunity
cost of the clients’ time. Clearly intermediaries will have a lower value for their time than ¯ θ–the
highest wage in the economy, thus the only reasonable way this can fail is if the amount of regulation
reduction (∆) is trivially small. Also notice that if c ≤ 0 then this market always exists. One must
increase c to stop this equilibrium.
4.1.2 The Fourth Option: Some Bribers choose to use Intermediaries (bd 6= ∅ and
bi 6= θ)
In this case, we deﬁne θ
b
d as the lowest type who prefers bribing the bureaucrat directly to all other
options. Similarly, we deﬁne θ
b
i as the lowest type who prefers using the intermediary for bribing to
both bribing the bureaucrat directly and not oﬀering a bribe (b superscript is for the existence of
both types of bribes). This insight is crucial for the following lemma.




i then no one will directly bribe the bureaucrat, and bd = ∅ is optimal.





i (ηrl +( 1− η)r∗) − bd ≤ v − θ
b
irl − pi (9)




i . Since this is also true for all θ ≥ θ
b
i , these clients will prefer




i then no one will directly
oﬀer a bribe and we have bd = ∅.





bd <b i. The proﬁt function of the bureaucrat is:

























d is determined as before, or bd = θ
b
dη∆. The marginal type who uses the intermediary now
















and this gives us bi = bd +( 1− η)θ
b


































The most startling thing about this objective function is that θ
b
d = θd. In other words, the lowest
type who prefers bribing the bureaucrat directly to all other options is unchanged from the case
where there is no intermediary, or it is the θd that solves H (θd)=
ρF
∆ (with θd = θ if H (θ) >
ρF
∆ ).
This result, however, would be true in general. It is based on the fact that this marginal person is
still making the same decision as before. They are still choosing between not bribing and facing the
regulation or paying the bribe. Hence, from now one we will drop the b superscript for this type and
use θd.
Of course this logic does not hold for the person indiﬀerent between using an intermediary and











We don’t have any caveat on what to do when there is no such θ,i fH (θ) >
c−ηρF
(1−η)∆ then there is no





(1−η)∆ t h e r ei sn oo n eu s i n ga ni n t e r m e d i a r y .


































10Lemma 5 (Existence) When bd 6= ∅ and bi 6= ∅ it must be that ρF ≤ c ≤ (1 − η)∆¯ θ + ηρF.
Proof. See the discussion above.
4.2 The Equilibrium
In the previous subsection we analyzed the four options available to the bureaucrat. Since he has ﬁrst
mover’s advantage we now ﬁnd the equilibrium by ﬁnding out which option maximizes his proﬁts.
Notice that by revealed preferences one should expect that if bureaucrats can take bribes both
directly and indirectly then this will be proﬁt maximizing. In general the only reason to constrain
your choices is if one of your unconstrained choices is not feasible, and that is what occurs here.
We actually prove that if taking bribes both directly and through intermediaries is feasible it has a
strictly higher proﬁt. If this does not happen then the bureaucrat falls back on choosing the cost
minimizing option. The cost of decreasing regulations when one takes a bribe from an intermediary
is c, the implicit cost of reducing regulations when one takes a bribe from the client is ρF,i fc ≤ ρF
the bureaucrat only accepts bribes from intermediaries. The bureaucrat only takes bribes directly
when both of the above conditions fail, or c ≥ (1 − η)∆¯ θ+ηρF.T h i si st h ee s s e n c eo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
in subsection 4.2.1, in subsection 4.2.2 we discuss the possible equilibria under optimal government
policy.
4.2.1 Equilibrium with all Government Policies














∆¯ θ ≤ ρF<cthen some bribers use intermediaries and some directly bribe the
bureaucrat;
3. ρF ≥ c then all bribers use intermediaries.
Proof. It is easiest to prove the parts of the proposition in reverse order.
To establish part 3 note that when ρF ≥ c we can not have bribes being taken both from
intermediaries and clients. Furthermore this implies θi ≤ θd thus Πi > Πd and bribes will only be
accepted from intermediaries.
For part 2 note that if θ
b
i ≤ ¯ θ then Πb ≥ Πd, θ
b






∆¯ θ ≤ ρF.
Furthermore if ρF<cthen Πb > Πi.T o s e e t h i s ﬁr s tn o t i c et h a ti fc = ρF then θi = θ
b
i = θd and










∂c = −(1 − G(θi))
11thus when ρF<cθ
b
i > θi and ∂Πb
∂c > ∂Πi
∂c .3 These facts imply that for ρF<cΠi < Πb.






∆¯ θ we have Πd = Πb, and by the above we know that
Πb > Πi,a n da l s o∂Πd
∂c =0> ∂Πi







Notice how much more common corruption is due to intermediaries. The conditions of Lemma
1o ﬀer a wide variety of policies that could stop corruption, in Proposition 1 it is impossible to stop
bribery. This greatly limits government’s ability to control corruption.
To illustrate these conditions consider the simple case where G(·) is the uniform distribution



















































and it is easy to see that when both are possible Πi > Πd,a n dw i t hal i t t l em o r ea l g e b r ao n ec a n
show that Πb > Πi when c ∈
¡
ρF,(1 − η)∆¯ θ + ηρF
¤
.
4.2.2 Equilibrium with Optimal Expected Punishment
In this section, we will ﬁnd optimal expected punishment by government and show that under
optimal expected punishment, if all bribery takes place via intermediaries then the opportunity cost
of using an intermediary must be negative.
To ﬁnd optimal expected punishment, we deﬁne the external cost of policy variables function–
eC (ρ,F,η,∆). This function essentially represents the tax burden imposed by trying to control
corruption.
Unlike a traditional cost function there is no reason to assume that the marginal cost of any of
these parameters is positive or negative. In fact it is not uncommon that analysts assume ∂eC
∂F < 0–
or the money collected from the bureaucrat can be put to good use. What we will assume is:
Assumption Increasing the level of monitoring (ρ) has a positive marginal external cost, or ∂eC
∂ρ >
0.


































12If this is true then simple optimization shows that at any optimal level of regulation ∂eC
∂F > 0.
Lemma 6 At any optimal level of expected punishment, z = ρ∗F∗ then either ∂eC
∂F > 0 or z =0 .
Proof. Notice that everywhere in our analysis we could replace ρF with z = ρF without loss of
generality. Thus we can solve the social cost minimization problem:




eC (ρ,F,η,∆) − λ(ρF − z)
When z =0we do not have a claim. Hence let us consider when 0 <z≤ ρF or ρ∗ > 0 and F∗ > 0.
Since from a ﬁrst order condition ∂eC
∂ρ − λF =0and from our assumption ∂eC
∂ρ > 0,i tm u s tb et h e
case that λ > 0. Since ∂eC
∂F − λρ =0 , it must be that ∂eC
∂F > 0.
The intuition behind this result is immediate, if society beneﬁts from increasing F and decreasing
ρ then it is obvious what to do. It is only when both techniques are costly that society might want
to limit F. One might wonder how this is possible. Surely increasing ﬁnes always beneﬁts society?
If bureaucrats had unlimited budgets then this would be true, but since bureaucrats have a limited
lifetime income there is a point where this tactic will not work in the real world. In this case the
only way to increase F would be through jail time, which does have a positive external cost. Also
if F is too high the investigators might be less willing to expose a bureaucrat if his crime doesn’t
seem “too severe,” and the investigator might start taking bribes from the bureaucrat. Both of these
things would mean that the external cost of increasing F is positive. This result immediately gives
us the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If and only if all clients are using intermediaries can the opportunity cost of using the
intermediary be negative under optimal government policy.
Proof. >From Proposition 1 we observe all clients using intermediaries if and only if c ≤ ρF.
If c ≤ 0 then c ≤ ρF, and by Proposition 1, all clients use intermediaries. If c>0 and c ≤ ρF then
increasing ρF has no impact on the quantity of corruption or the utility of any person involved in
the model, and by Lemma 6 it has a positive external cost, thus ρF<c . Hence some clients will
not be using the intermediary.
This is a simple and testable implication of our model. In any market where everyone uses
intermediaries it must be that the regulation requires so much knowledge and expertise that only
an intermediary can handle it eﬃciently. However notice that this does not prove that there is
corruption. The negative opportunity cost of the intermediary does not depend on their ability to
reduce the level of regulation. In such a market everyone uses intermediaries even if there is no
corruption.
5 Fighting Corruption
Since our paper necessarily only has a partial model of the economy, if we were to construct a
welfare function both the beneﬁts of regulation and the cost of policy variables would necessarily be
13a reduced form function. This would complicate analysis without increasing our understanding of
the fundamentals, thus instead we focus on a simpler objective where the impact of policy variables
is clear within our analysis, the impact of intermediaries and policy variables on the quantity of
regulation (Qr). An analyst or government with a well speciﬁed general welfare function can then
take our analysis of this variable as an input into their welfare maximization.
The implicit assumption is that it is welfare maximizing to have all clients face the given optimal
regulation level. This is appropriate if not meeting the regulation imposes some externality on
the economy. Hence when we say a policy will increase regulation we mean that the increase is
towards the optimal quantity. Regulation can also address allocational issues–see Guriev [8] for
example–but in our paper we are not considering this type of regulation.
We will consider three policy variables, η, ρF,a n d∆.T h eﬁrst one (η) represents the trustwor-
thiness of bureaucrats, η near one means the bureaucrat is trustworthy. If a client tries to bribe him
directly then he almost always reduces the regulation. This can be reduced by moving bureaucrats
around in the government, if a bureaucrat is not in one department for long he can not develop a
reputation for taking bribes and thus it is not worth it to him to reduce regulation level. Bardhan [2]
suggests periodic job rotation as an anti-corruption measure, so that a bureaucrat does not become
too cozy with a customer over a long period. We assume that it is not possible to reduce η to zero.
The second variable (ρF) is the expected punishment, as discussed above in our model it does not
aﬀect anything to vary the probability of an investigation (ρ)a n dt h eﬁne imposed (F) independently,
thus we will simplify the discussion by only changing them jointly. The third variable (∆)r e p r e s e n t s
the amount of control the bureaucrat has over the level of regulation. Government can control this
variable to a limited degree by making the bureaucrat provide more documentation and signatures
from other bureaucrats. In the absence of intermediary agents, limiting discretionary power of
bureaucrats is considered an important tool to combat corruption (Rose-Ackerman [17], Bardhan
[2], [5]). We will refer these additional requirements for documentation as “secondary red tape” and
discuss its eﬀects in more depth below. For now, let us consider that ∆ can be between ∆ and r∗,
where ∆ > 0. We will continue to assume that the highest type can aﬀord to use an intermediary,
or that ¯ θ∆ >c .
Proposition 2 Intermediaries always strictly reduce the quantity of regulation, by:









2. ∆(1 − η)(1− G(θi)) + η∆(G(θi) − G(θd)) if ρF ≥ c (note that G(θi) − G(θd) > 0)
Proof. This is immediate once we establish what the quantity of regulation is in each situation.
When clients can only bribe the bureaucrat directly the expected regulation is ηrl +( 1− η)r∗ =
r∗ − η∆, clients who do not bribe face regulation r∗,t h u s :
Qd
r = r∗ − η∆(1 − G(θd))
14If all clients who want to bribe choose to use intermediaries then people who oﬀer bribes face
regulation level rl = r∗ −∆, thus in this case the quantity of regulation is Qi
r = r∗ −∆(1 − G(θi)).
By combining these two cases one can ﬁnd that when some clients oﬀer bribes directly and some
choose to use intermediaries then Qb
r = r∗−∆
³






. Thus, when ρF<c ,
Qr changes from Qd
r to Qb
r decreasing regulation by the amounted stated in (1) and when ρF ≥ c,
Qr changes from Qd
r to Qi
r decreasing regulation by the amount stated in (2).








is immediate. The only change when
intermediaries are present is for those who use them, and they have their regulation decreased by
the quantity ∆ with an additional probability of 1 − η.W h e n ρF ≥ c there is also the fact that
more people now choose to oﬀer bribes because it is “cheaper” for the bureaucrat to accept them.
While this is an interesting–and not unexpected–conclusion what is more important for a
government in such a situation is how well they can control the quantity of regulation. Here again
the news is generally bad. Two of their three instruments have a reduced level of power, and











.T h er e a d e r
can clearly extend the analysis to the cases where this is not true.
Proposition 3 Assume that c>0. Then when there are no intermediaries increasing expected
punishment (ρF) and decreasing the reliability of bureaucrats (η) and the amount they can change
regulation (∆) increase the quantity of regulation.
When intermediaries are present increasing expected punishment and reducing bureaucrat’s trust-
worthiness are less eﬀective in increasing the level of regulation. In fact these policies may decrease
the quantity of regulation.
On the other hand decreasing the amount of control that the bureaucrat has over the level of
regulation (∆)i sm o r ee ﬀective than before.
Proof. Notice that ∂θd
∂ρF = 1
∆H0(θd), ∂θd





H0(θd) where H0 (θ) ≥ 1, then the
partial derivatives when all clients bribe the bureaucrat directly are:
∂Qd
r




∂η = −(1 − G(θd))∆ < 0,
∂Qd
r
∂∆ = −η(1 − G(θd)) + η∆g(θd) ∂θd
∂∆ < 0































































































and these derivatives are now closer to zero or might have changed sign.































































∂ρF ≤ 0 only requires that
g(θ)























While we would not want to assume that
g(θ)
H0(θ) is decreasing we know that it is decreasing over at
least part of the range for several common distributions. For the Uniform distribution it is constant,




µ, and it is always decreasing. For the Weibull
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it is always decreasing, for a ≤ 1









H0(θ) is also decreasing for large θ with the log-normal distribution, for example if the mean
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Graph of
g(θ)
H0(θ) when θ has a standard log-normal distribution.
the function is decreasing when θ ≥ 1.669,o rw h e nG(θ) ≥ .7.
It might be rarer that
∂Qb
r































and what we need is either that
G(θd)−G(θb
i)





i) is large. The latter is probably
common if η is nearly one, the former is harder to satisfy. Both the numerator and denominator are






→ 0 faster than c−ρF.I ti sh a r d
to know when such a speciﬁc condition is true.
In the uniform case both of these derivatives are zero, or if some clients use intermediaries then η
and ρF have no eﬀect. When all clients oﬀer bribes directly Qd
r = r∗ −η 1
2
¯ θ∆−ρF
¯ θ−θ , when some clients
use intermediaries and some go directly it is Qb
r = r∗ − 1
2
¯ θ∆−c
¯ θ−θ ,a n dQi
r = Qb
r.
Thus it is probably common that when some clients use intermediaries and some oﬀer bribes
directly, increasing the expected punishment has the wrong eﬀect. It is harder to guess how common
it is that decreasing the trustworthiness of bureaucrats has the wrong eﬀect, but in at least one case
we can illustrate it has no eﬀect on the quantity of regulation.
6 Extensions and Discussion
Before we conclude, we would like to discuss two topics more closely. First, it is common for
governments to limit the discretionary power of bureaucrats (decrease ∆) by using “secondary red
tape.” For example forms need to be ﬁlled out in triplicate, signed by multiple bureaucrats in
separate buildings, etcetera. We deﬁne these as socially wasteful regulation that serves no purpose
other than to make r∗−rl smaller. However, as we will clarify below, one should realize that this will
also make c l o w e r .T h em o r et h es e c o n d a r yr e dt a p et h em o r eb e n e ﬁt there is to having a specialist
who knows her way around the bureaucracy. Thus we would like to discuss when secondary red tape
can increase or decrease the quantity of regulation.
17Second, we want to discuss what happens when intermediaries or clients using intermediaries
are legally liable for corruption. We model this as investigators sometimes being able to prove that
the intermediary did oﬀer a bribe. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of US and similar laws
introduced by OECD countries make it possible to prosecute companies in their home countries for
paying bribes abroad. OECD anti-bribery convention signed by member countries in 1997 makes it
clear that the anti-bribery laws apply to bribes paid “directly or indirectly” and US authorities have
on several occasions prosecuted companies in cases where intermediaries paid bribes on their behalf.
Hence, these observations suggest that we should consider the case where corruption is discovered
with some probability when intermediaries are involved.
6.1 Limiting the Discretionary Power of Bureaucrats by “Secondary Red
Tape”
A common occurrence in corrupt bureaucracy is that government imposes excessive checks and
balances to limit the discretionary power of bureaucrats. Each piece of paperwork has to be signed
by multiple bureaucrats, each action must be cross-checked several times. The goal of these checks
is to make certain that the regulation is satisﬁed in the ﬁrst place, or to decrease the amount that
a bureaucrat can reduce the level of regulation, increasing the eﬀective rl. Rose-Ackerman [17] has
suggested that multiple oﬃcials with overlapping jurisdictions may help because the potential briber
has to face the prospect of “persuading” all the oﬃcials involved, which raises costs and uncertainty
for the corrupt project. We refer to these types of regulations as secondary red tape.
The problem with secondary red tape in the presence of intermediaries is that it increases the
beneﬁt of using an intermediary. Since intermediary agents deal with the bureaucracy for a living,
they know all the rules, regulations, and secondary checks required. In other words, when government
increases secondary red tape, the opportunity cost of using the intermediary decreases, and people
are more likely to use intermediaries.
To illustrate this point we want to look at a pure form of secondary red tape. The type of red
tape that does not actually increase rl, it merely increases the cost of getting the regulation level rl.
Thus we will assume that the true regulation clients face is not changed–it is always rl,b u ti n s t e a d
the amount they have to pay to get the regulation level rl increases to rl +s, or the bureaucrat can
only reduce the cost of regulation by ˜ ∆ = r∗ −rl −s. We will also assume that the opportunity cost
of using the intermediary is a function of s, c(s), and it is decreasing (c0 (s) < 0). In this situation
increasing s will have a reduced impact in the presence of intermediaries, and can actually reduce
regulation.
Proposition 4 If c>0 and c0 (s) ≤−c
˜ ∆ then when ρF ≥ c regulation will decrease, if in addition,
g(θ)
H0(θ) is decreasing regulation will also decrease when ρF ≤ c.






















































































































∂s , the ﬁrst term will also be negative if
g(θ)
H0(θ) is decreasing in θ.
Thus increasing secondary red tape arbitrarily can worsen the situation. We would also suggest
that in many cases secondary red tape has already created a situation where c<0, simplifying red
tape will reduce corruption in that case.
6.2 Regulation of Intermediaries
To a certain extent regulating intermediaries is impossible. What is the diﬀerence between an
intermediary agent and a ﬁrm which specializes in dealing with the bureaucracy? Or a friend who
just came along to help out? It seems diﬃcult to eliminate them by simply making them illegal.
Catching intermediaries bribing someone is even more diﬃcult. Clients do not even need to know
what the money given to the intermediary was spent on.
However regulating intermediaries is not necessarily without hope. As we mentioned earlier,
there is an international consensus emerging towards holding clients responsible if intermediaries
pay bribes on their behalf. Furthermore, if intermediaries are required to get a license then they can
also be required to account for their fees. Also, an illegal intermediary can not advertise easily or do
business with large corporations providing an incentive to intermediaries operate within the formal
sector.
Thus we want to extend our model in a simple manner that will allow the reader to see how the
possibility of discovering corruption when intermediaries are involved would change things. We sug-
gest that when an investigator ﬁnds something suspicious about a bureaucrat (where investigations
occur with probability ρ) then he can–by investigating the intermediary and the client using the
19intermediary–ﬁnd corroborating evidence with probability µ.W ea s s u m et h a ti ft h i so c c u r st h e r e
is not actually any penalty imposed on the intermediary, but that the bureaucrat is ﬁned like before.
T h ei m p a c to ft h i si st oe ﬀectively increase the cost of the intermediary to the bureaucrat by
µρF, and with this modiﬁcation the equilibrium conditions are:















c − (η − µ)ρF
(1 − η)∆
.
Thus the general eﬀect is just to replace c with c+µρF everywhere. Thus Propositions 1 and 2 are
unchanged except for this, and in Proposition 3 most of the diﬀerences can be modeled by making




































and this will be negative less frequently if µ is large (never if µ>η), and obviously increasing ρF




Thus it is clear that if intermediaries are eﬀectively regulated then corruption can be stopped.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we analyzed the eﬀects of intermediary agents on corruption and regulation and
discussed whether solutions to the corruption problem change in the presence of intermediaries. In
our analysis the level of regulation set by the government is assumed to be optimal. Clients may
pay bribes directly or indirectly–using intermediaries–to circumvent the necessary regulations.
We show that if intermediaries are economically viable then they always reduce the quantity of
regulation below its optimal level. Furthermore, policies such as increasing expected punishment for
the corrupt bureaucrat and moving bureaucrats around to prevent entrenchment are less eﬀective
in increasing the level of regulation towards the eﬃcient level. In fact these policies may decrease
the quantity of regulation. Limiting the discretionary power of the bureaucrat is the only policy
that might be more eﬀective in the presence of intermediaries. However even this needs to be
exercised with caution. In order to limit the discretionary power of bureaucrats governments often
rely on excessive documentation and multiple signatures which in turn increase the beneﬁto fu s i n g
intermediaries.
The primary implication of our work is that ignoring intermediaries will lead to misguided poli-
cies, which might make corruption worse. This point is also supported by cases studies like Fjeldstad
20[7]. The Tanzanian government launched an anti-corruption campaign by ﬁring all corrupt bureau-
crats. Private business immediately hired these bureaucrats, who used their insider contacts to
construct new corruption networks. What seemed like a simple solution increased the problem
because the government ignored the market for intermediaries.
What are the possible solutions then to the corruption problem in the presence of intermedi-
aries? Increasing opportunity cost of using an intermediary by simplifying red tape and not moving
bureaucrats around may help reduce corruption. Regulation of intermediaries should help as well; if
intermediaries could not advertise or work for large corporations without a license then it would be
possible to monitor their behavior and audit their accounts. It would also be helpful to hold clients
accountable if intermediary agents pay bribes on their behalf. What is clear is that if governments
ignore the problem of intermediaries then they will have little success in eliminating corruption.
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